In the absence of express stipulations the charterer is impliedly under an absolute obligation to provide a cargo according to the charter. Since the shipowner is not concerned with the methods by which the charterer intends to acquire the cargo, the arrangements for procuring that cargo are outside the scope of the contract.
Per Lord Esher in Nielsen v Wait (1885) 16 QBD 67 at p.72:
"Running days" are those days, on which a ship in the ordina course is running. It is true that when they are lay days, they do not take effect under charterparty until the ship has done running; but the parties are describing the days about wh they are talking, namely, days in a port, according to the phraseology which they use with regar to a ship at sea. "Running days" therefore mean the whole of every day when a ship is running. What is that? That is every day, day and night. There it is as plain as possible. They are the days during which, if the ship were at sea, she would be running.
That means every day. Now Abinger, C.B., in Brown v Johnson (1842) 10 M. & W. 331 pointed out that "days," inasmuch as they are working days, do in point of fact mean the same as "running days," because if so many days for loading and unloading are mentioned in a charterparty, not only working days are intended but every day, including Sundays and holidays. Therefore "running days" comprehend every day including Sundays and holidays, and "running days" and "days" are the same.