Every breach of contract gives right to injured party to claim either damages or the agreed sum – i.e. to claim specific enforcement of the defendant’s primary obligation or specific performance or an injunction, but not every breach gives to the innocent party the right to terminate the contract.
Lord Goddard CJ said in A-G (ex rel Allen) v Colchester Corp  2 All ER 124 at p.128:
No authority has been quoted to show that an injunction will be granted enjoining a person to carry on a business, nor can I think that one ever would be, certainly not where the business is a losing concern.
Per Megarry J in C H Giles & Co Ltd v Morris  1 All ER 960 at p.969:
Mandatory injunctions are by no means unknown, and there is normally no question of the court having to send its officers to supervise the performance of the order of the court. Prohibitory injunctions are common, and again there is no direct supervision by the court. Performance of each type of injunction is normally secured by the realisation of the person enjoined that he is liable to be punished for contempt if evidence of his disobedience to the order is put before the court; and if the injunction is prohibitory, actual committal will usually, so long as it continues, make disobedience impossible.
In Braddon Towers Ltd v International Stores Ltd (1979)  1 EGLR 209, where Slade J said at p.213:
Whether or not this may be properly described as a rule of law, I do not doubt that for many years practitioners have advised their clients that it is the settled and invariable practice of this court never to grant mandatory injunctions requiring persons to carry on business.
Per Nourse LJ in Warren v Mendy  1 WLR 853 at p.860:
Any consideration of the authorities must be made with two general thoughts in mind. First, in this as much as in any other area of the law an injunction is a discretionary remedy, whose grant or refusal, especially at an interlocutory stage, depends on the infinitely variable facts of the individual case. Although statements of the principles on which the discretion ought to be exercised in some particular area are often authoritative, they are principles of practice rather than of law, whose application may be rendered inappropriate by the finest of factual variations between one case and another. Secondly, the discretion belongs, as always, to the judge of first instance. His decision can only be interfered with by an appellate court if he has erred in principle, if he has not exercised his discretion at all or if he has exercised it in a manner which is plainly wrong.