In many cases contract specifically provides for remedies available to the aggrieved party, in all other instances this question to be decided by the court. Extent of available remedial actions depends on the nature of the terms has been breached, on consequences, and effect of it, subject to limiting or excluding provisions, if any.
Bradford v Williams (1872) LR 7 Exch 259, per Martin, B at p 261:
Contracts are so various in their terms that it is really impossible to argue from the letter of one to the letter of another. All we can do is to apply the spirit of the law to the facts of each particular case. … The real question, apart from all technical expressions, is, what in each instance is the substance of the contract.
In Glynn v Margetson  AC at p 351, Lord Halsbury at p.357 state a rule also known as 'the main purpose rule':
My Lords, I am entirely of the same opinion. It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole of the instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole of the instrument, and seeing what one must regard, for a reason which I will give in a moment, as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.